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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DAVID R. WILLIAMS DBA
INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATIONS,
Plaintiff,
-v-

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH, HALS. BENNETT,
FRANK WARNER and EUGENE S.
LAMBERT, COMMISSIONERS OF THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defendants.

Case No.
12871

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This was an action initiated by plaintiff to obtain a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity from the Public Service
Commission of Utah, which would allow him to operate a
mobile radio-telephone communications' system in the central
area of Utah.

DISPOSITION IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
Upon a thorough and complete review of all evidence
presented during four days of hearings, the Public Service
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Commission, by Commissioners Hal S. Bennett, Donald Hacking and John T. Vernieu, on February 3rd, 1972, denied plaintiff's application. The reasons were, as follows:
" (a) That protestant, Mobile Radio Telephone
Service, Inc., an RCC operation in the Wasatch Front
Area, has constantly earnestly and energetically sought
to and has substantially upgraded and expanded its
service to the public since its certification by the Commission.
" ( b) That when channel congestion was indicated on both protestants' system and the Mountain
Bell mobile radio system, protestant filed and actively
presented applications with the Federal Communications Commission for additional channels. The granting of all or some of these channels will greatly relieve the present congestion and broaden the service to
new customers.
" ( c) That to grant the application herein would
be clearly against the public interest."
Plaintiff made application for rehearing on February 22,
1972. The Public Service Commission, by Commissioners Hal
S. Bennett, Frank Warner, and Eugene S. Lambert determined
that the application was without merit, and it was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Public Service Com·
mission's Order and the defendants ask that it be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 18th, 1971, David R. Williams, dba Industrial Communications (hereinafter referred to as plaintiff)
2

applied for a "Certificate of Convenience and Necessity" from
the Utah Public Service Commission to provide two-way radio
paging and dispatch service to the general public in the central
area of Utah from a proposed transmitting antenna to be
located on Kessler Peak, southwest of Magna, Utah.
At that time, the plaintiff operated mobile units and
fixed radio-telephone units in Vernal, Utah. Substantially similar radio dispatching service was being offered to the central
Utah public by Mountain Bell Telephone and Mobile Radio
Telephone Service, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as the protestant.)
During the course of the hearings, plaintiff presented a
number of witnesses subscribing to the protestant's service
who testified that there was a problem with "overcrowded
channel lines." One witness, Mr. Ken Isaacson, testified that
he received terrific service from the protestant, and that his
overcrowding problems came only during peak hours when
congestion was greatest.
Michael Fullmer testified that the greatest problem with
protestant's service was congested lines. However, the record
indicates that Mr. Fullmer abused the service, helping to create
the very problem complained of.
A further witness called by the plaintiff, Mr. Jerry
Stanger, testified that he had discontinued protestant's service
several years before. However, the discontinuance was predicated upon lack of need, and because he had moved his business to another area not serviced by the protestant.
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The testimony of Merrill Wilson, M.D., solicited by the
plaintiff, indicated a dissatisfaction with protestant's service.
However, the doctor's knowledge was based only on information from a third party, and he professed no personal experience with the actual transmission and reception of messages.
All of these witnesses and many others testified, however, that
the protestant had earnestly and expeditiously corrected all
problems as they arose.
Evidence was presented by Barton North of Mountain
Bell, which indicated that while their channels were overloaded and crowded there were no held orders in 1968, 69,
and 70, and that they had five less units in 1970 than in 1968.
These figures, coupled with a survey of the Salt Lake Metropolitan area, conducted by Mr. North, demonstrated that there
was not an immediate demand for additional services.
The protestant had been operating two channels in the
15 0 Mhz range. In response to com plaints of overcrowding,
Mr. Bangerter, president of the protestant company, filed with
the F.C.C. for three additional channels in the 450 Mhz range,
in October, 1969. Two 150 Mhz channels were granted by the
F.C.C. prior to June, 1970. The protestant then applied for
five additional channels in the 150 Mhz range. None of the
applications were denied although there was a delay in implementation.
The protestant was operating under Certificate of Convenience and Necessity, No. 1419, issued by the Public Service
Commission on October 11, 1962, and was complying with all
of the rules and regulations of the Commission.
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The Commission previously denied a similar application
for a new service in the mobile-radio dispatching area in Case
No. 6144. Un the Matter of the Application of Utah Mobile
Telephone Company.} The Order was not appealed.
There were no complaints registered with the Commission against the protestant's service that could have provided
a basis for investigation by the Commission. In fact, a number
of witnesses testified that the service offered by the protestant
was excellent. Michael C. Kenyon, a subscriber for several
years, indicated that he was pleased with the service and had
not experienced any problems with receiving messages. Ben
Banks, testifying that he used the service seven days a week for
business, personal and church matters, stated that he had never
missed any business because of a busy line. Commenting on
the excellence of protestant's service, Alva W. Rawdon noted
that as a shop manager for a large automobile dealer he had
never received any complaints from his personnel, and that the
protestant was always sensitive to his problems and cooperative
in trying to solve them.
Further evidence of the protestant's ability to provide
adequate service and to correct any and all problems as they
arose is presented in Point III of this Brief.
The facts presented in plaintiff's Brief are substantially
correct with the following modifications concerning plaintiff's facts

# 17-23:

1. At the time of the hearing, Amos R. Jackson served
as chief engineer on the staff of the Public Service Commission in the Department of Business Regulation. One of his
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duties was to advise the Commission on matters upon
which the commissioners requested his opinion. These included engineering, economic, and legal opinions within the scope
of his expertise. (T. 432-41).
2. Mr. Jackson testified that his contacts with Mr.
Bangerter (president of the protestant company) were in
connection with his duties as chief engineer of the Public Service Commission. (T. 432-37).
3. Mr. Jackson is president of Intermountain Engineers
which had furnished, through his brother, engineering services to the protestant. However, Mr. Jackson, personally, did
not render advice or assistance to the protestant concerning his
course of action in the instant matter, other than assistance
which normally would be offered in the ordinary course of his
duties with the Public Service Commission. These duties require that he "cover the waterfront" and have continuous contact with those who come within his jurisdiction. ( T. 43 2-446).
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE FINDINGS AND ORDERS OF THE UTAH
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ARE PRESUM·
ED VALID AND MUST BE UPHELD ON AP·
PEAL, UNLESS IT IS DETERMINED THAT THE
COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY, CAPRICIOUSLY, OR UNREASONABLY.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-16 ( 1953), grants
to this Court the power to review, on appeal through a Writ
of Certiorari, all findings and orders of the Utah Public Ser·
6

vice Commission, with the exception that "[T} he findings and
conclusions of the commission on questions of facts shall be
fin al and not subject to review. Such questions of fact shall
include ultimate facts and the findings and conclusions of the
commission on reasonableness and discrimination."
Pursuant to this section, this Court has given wide latitude to the Public Service Commission in exercising its statutory authority. In Utah Gas Service Co. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. and Public Service Commission, 18 Utah 2d 310, 422
P.2d 530 (1967), the Court in awarding an exclusive franchise to a gas company to furnish natural gas service to a
municipality on the basis that evidence presented in the hearing, indicating that the company had built a line within one
mile of town, was sufficient to sustain the Public Service Commission's findings, stated:
"Under our law, the Public Service Commission is
charged with the responsibility of granting franchises
and regulating such utilities in the public interest. It
is necessarily endowed with considerable latitude of discretion to enable it to accomplish that purpose." 18
Utah 2d, at 313. (Emphasis added.)
This Court has further determined that the findings and
conclusions resulting from the Public Service Commission's
judicially encouraged "wide latitude" are clothed with verity
and must be examined in the light most favorable to the Commission.
In a more recent case, Armored Motors Service v. Public
Service Commission, 23 Utah 2d 418, 464 P.2d 582 (1970),
this doctrine is clearly announced. This Court stated, in upholding a Public Service Commission decision that the author-
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ity of a common motor earner delivery servICe be enlarged
in a particular area:
"However . . . it must be realized that the legislature has given the commission the responsibility for
the overall planning and regulation of certain public
services because that is the purpose for which the commission was established and functions - it is assumed
to have specialized knowledge and expertise in that
field. Consequently it is accorded comparatively broad
prerogatives in carrying on investigations and making
determinations in the discharge of its duties. For these
reasons its findings and orders are endowed with presumptions of verity; and upon appeal to this court, we
assume that the commission believed those aspects of
the evidence which support its findings and we review
the record in the light most favorable to them." 23
Utah 2d at 420-21.
This Court has consistantly and uniformly adopted this
policy, and in practice has set aside Commission orders only if
the Commission acts outside of its authority or in any unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious manner. This solid precedent
was established in Goodrich v. Public Service Commission, 114
Utah 296, 198 P.2d 995 (1948), and followed in virtually all
succeeding cases dealing with this problem. A more recent
expression of the Court's intent is found in Uintah Freightways v. Public Service Commission, 15 Utah 2d 221, 390
P .2d (1964), involving an action to review a Public Service
Commission's Order directing suspension of a tariff published
by a common carrier. In upholding its decision, this Court
said:
"Where a Public Service Commission has acted
within the scope of its authority, its order will be upheld if it has any substantial f ound,ition in the evr

dence and is not unreasonable, [or} arbitrary or capricious." 15 Utah 2d at 223-24. (Emphasis added.)
It is evident from these judicial fiats that this Court, in

reviewing Public Service Commission decisions, has evolved
a two-fold concern: ( 1) whether the Commission acted within
the scope of its statutory authority, and ( 2) whether its actions
are capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable. While the former is
determined by reviewing the applicable statutes, and such
authority is not challenged in this case, the latter has been clarified by case law decisions and will not be found to be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious if there is any factual evidence
to support the finding.
In Salt Lake Transfer Company v. Public Service Commission, 11 Utah 2d 121, 355 P.2d 706 (1960), this Court,
in sustaining a Commission Order amending a Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity increasing the authority of a common earner to render further service, held that:

"We will not disturb the findings of the commission if supported by substantial evidence and are
reasonable in view of the evidence . . . [R}ealizing the
limits of this court to review the orders of the commission, nevertheless, if in relation to the facts before it,
if the commission acts in an arbitrary and capricious
manner, the order is without authority and must be
set aside.
"Whatever the minimum quality and quantity of
evidence necessary to justify administrative action,
orders issued in complete absence of factual support are
clearly arbitrary, capricious, and void." 11 Utah 2d at
124, 127. (Emphasis added.)

9

The clearest judicial expression on this point is found
in Utah Gas Service Company v. Mountain Fuel Supply, supra,
where this Court concluded that:
"When the Commission, in performing its duties
has given consideration to pertinent facts and has made
its findings and decision, they are endowed with a
presumption of validity and correctness. In accordance
with the recognized prerogatives of the trier of the
facts, on appeal the evidence is viewed in the light most
favorable to sustaining them; and the decision will not
be reversed unless when the evidence is so viewed,
there is no reasonable basis to support the Commission's action, so that it thus appears to be capricious
and arbitrary, a situation which is not shown to exist
here." 18 Utah 2d at 315. (Emphasis added.)
These two cases demonstrate that the Court is concerned
with the existence of competent evidence and a reasonable
decision made therefrom. If these are present, arbitrariness and
capriciousness are not.
Therefore, defendant respectfully submits that this Court
has uniformly and consistently given a wide latitude of discretion to the Public Service Commission and a presumption of
verity to its findings. In clear, unambiguous language, this
Court has determined that a Public Service Commission decision will be overturned only if deemed unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. In applying this principle, the courts have
looked to two areas: ( 1) whether the Commission acted within its statutory authority, and ( 2) whether the conclusion
reached was reasonable from the evidence presented. These are
the two areas which this Court must now examine in confronting the problem at bar.
10

POINT

II

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ACTED
WITHIN ITS SCOPE OF AUTHORITY IN
HEARING PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR ACERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND NECES-

SITY.

The Commission's authority to act in this case has been
impliedly challenged by innuendos raised in the plaintiff's
Brief. They have indicated that a two-way mobile radio dispatching service can be considered as a "quasi-utility'', and,
thus, not subject to the complete control of the Public Service
Commission. This analysis is statutorily incorrect. The tools
to act in this area have been clearly and unambiguously given
to the Commission by State statutory law. Utah Code Annotated, §54-4-25, (as amended 1965), declares that:
"No railroad corporation, street railroad corporation, aerial bucket tramway corporation, gas corporation, electric corporation, telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, heat corporation, automobile corporation, water corporation or sewage corporation shall
henceforth establish, or begin construction or operation
of a railroad, street railroad, aerial bucket tramway,
line, route, plant or system, or of any extension of such
railroad, street railroad, aerial bucket tramway, line,
route, plant or system, without having first obtained
from the commission a certificate that present or future
public convenience and necessity does or will require
such construction; . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
The plaintiff's anticipated service, two-way mobile radio-telephone dispatching, is included in this definition as a "telephone corporation." Utah Code Annotated, §54-2-1 ( 22)
( 195 3) defin es a telephone corporation as:
II

". . . every corporation and person, their lessees,
trustees and receivers or trustees appointed by any
court whatsoever, owning, controlling, operating or
managing any telephone line for public service within
this state."
A telephone line is defined in section 54-2-1 ( 21) as:
". . . all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cable, instruments and appliances, and all other real estate and
fixtures and personal property owned, controlled,
operated or managed in connection with or to facilitate ,
communication by telephone whether such communication is had with or without the use of transmission
wires." (Emphasis added.)
Clearly plaintiff's service is a telephone communication with·
out the use of transmission wires; thus, it is within the scope
of the Public Service Commission's authority to grant Certificates of Convenience and Necessity.
Furthermore, plaintiff admits in his Brief (p. 17) that:
. non wire-line R.C.C.'s are technically included as public
utilities by the [Utah} statute."
The Commission has previously acted under this author·
ity in granting Certificate #1504 (1964) to plaintiff and
# 1419 ( 1962) to the protestant.
The Court should take careful note of its recent decision
in Medic-Call, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 24 Utah 2d
273, 470 P.2d 258 ( 1970). In holding that an "answering
service" used only by physicians (a telephone receiver "beep
call") was not a utility, this Court accepted the C.J.S. test of
what constitutes a public service, regulatable by a Public Ser·
12

vice Commission. As defined m 7 3 C.J.S., Public Utilities,
§2, that test is:
. whether or not such person holds himself
out, expressly or impliedly, as engaged in the business
of supplying his product or service to the public, as a
class, or to any limited portion of it, as contradistinguished from holding himself out as serving or ready
to serve only particular individuals." 24 Utah 2d at
275.
The testimony of the plaintiff in the record of the Public Service Commission hearing clearly demonstrates that he envisions
his service as one to the public as a class.
Therefore, defendant respectfully submits that statutory
authority, previous practice, and recent case law conclusively
demonstrate that the Public Service Commission acted within
its authority in hearing plaintiff's request for a Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity.
POINT

III

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION DENYING PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION WAS REASONABLY DRAWN FROM
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED.
In reviewing applications for Certificates of Convenience
and Necessity which provide for services similar in nature to
those presently serving a particular area, the Public Service
Commission has adopted the position that the applicant must
demonstrate the following:
( 1)

a public need for his service

13

( 2)

a substantial inadequacy of existing service to
meet the need

( 3)

that the inadequacy must be due either to a
substantial deficiency of service facilities, beyond what could be supplied by normal improvements in the ordinary course of business, or to
indifference, poor management or disregard of
the rights of the customer persisting over such a
period of time as to establish an inability or
unwillingness to render adequate service.

( 4)

that he has the ability to provide service, in an
economically feasible manner.

1

1

1

Compelling authority for these criteria is found in Eckmiller
Transfer Company v. Armes, 269 S.W. 2d 287 (Ky. 1954); '
Ferguson-Steere Motor Company v. New Mexico State Corporation Commission, 21 PUR 3d 285 (1957); Re Harper, 42
PUR 3d 430 (1962), and in 41 PUR Digest 2d, Monopoly
and Competition, 3376.
It is necessary, therefore, to review the record of the Public Service Commission's hearing on plaintiff's application in
light of the above rationale. This examination will conclusively demonstrate that the decision rendered by the Public Ser·
vice Commission was reasonable from the evidence presented.

The record indicates that the plaintiff tried to show,
through his witnesses that there was a "need" which was not
being fulfilled by the predominant R.C.C. carrier (the protest·
ant). Plaintiff cited testimony from Charles Goff, his witness,
who testified that he needed additional radio service in his
business. An examination of the record reflects that Mr. Goff
had used Mountain Bell's telephone service and had found it
to be congested (T. 369). When asked on cross-examination
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if he would be interested in a service less congested than Mountain Bell's, Mr. Goff replied, "Certainly." (T. 373). Mr. Goff
indicated he had never had any contact personally with Mobile
Radio Telephone Service, Inc., (the protestant) and had not
made personal inquiry into its operation (T. 370-373). Therefore, Mr. Goff had not explored protestant's ability to fulfill his "need".
Neil W. Goodsell, M.D., was called to testify on behalf
of the plaintiff and indicated that he administered a private
radio service for a group of physicians. The service is operated by a beeper-type system, which is a one-way paging unit.
On cross-examination, Dr. Goodsell indicated that he had been
contacted shortly after the inception and organization of his
Medi-Call group by the protestant and had indicated that it
was too late for his group to use the protestant's services, as
his group was already in operation. However, he did indicate
that now if any other utility offered him a comparable service,
he would be interested in considering that service (T. 165).
He stated that he had only made limited personal inquiry as
to the services available to him by the protestant, and, therefore, was not aware of protestant's ability to fulfill his "need".
Dr. Goodsell indicated that he too had complaints about his
service from other doctors ( T. 171).
Ken Isaacson testified on behalf of the plaintiff that from
8:00 a.m., until approximately 3:30 p.m. he received terrific
service from the protestant ( T. 148), and that his problems
came during the peak hours when congestion was greatest
(Emphasis added.)
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The plaintiff stated that he had approximately fifty people
who might be interested in his service but, also, indicated that
none of them had given a firm commitment to subscribe (l '
652). In essence, there were "interested" parties, but any
business could get fifty people to say they were interested in
,
services without making any firm commitments.
1

The testimony of Michael Fullmer was distorted as Mr.
Fullmer abused the service and helped create the very congestion he claimed to be the biggest problem with protest·
ant's service. Mr. Fullmer indicated that he had examined
Mountain Bell's service and found the channel congestion
to be approximately the same (T. 548). Mr. Fullmer further
testified that he felt the overcrowding of the channels was the
great problem he had with protestant' s service ( T. 5 51).

1

1

Barton North of Mountain Bell testified that all of Moun·
tain Bell's channels were overloaded and crowded, but that
Mountain Bell had filed no present applications for additional
channels, although there were available channels open to Moun·
tain Bell (T. 646). He further indicated that during the years
1968, 1969 and 1967 there were no held orders; and that, in
fact, in 1970, there were five less units than in 1968 (T. 640).
(Emphasis added.) He testified that since 1968, Mountain
Bell had experienced fewer held orders than in prior years (T. ,
362). Mr. North said that through his studies he had found
that at least fifty percent of the customers who disconnected
were dissatisfied with the congested condition of the channels
and their inability to obtain access to the channels ( T. 362)
Mr. North conducted surveys of the metropolitan area of Salt
Lake and found that there was not an immediate demand for
additional services. He stated that the records for the past three
1
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years showed a stabilizing effect on the number of customers
Bell had. There were no additional requests for service and no appreciable difference in the number of subscribers for the previous two years ( T. 363). (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff presented further testimony by one Jerry Stanger
who had been a subscriber of Mobile Radio Telephone Service, Inc., and had discontinued the service several years ago
because of channel overloading. However, overloading was
only one of the reasons for Mr. Stanger's disconnection. Mr.
Stanger discontinued the service because of his lack of need for
it and because his office had moved to Syracuse in Davis
County. He further indicated that at such time as Mobile Radio
Telephone Service, Inc., obtained an Ogden line or an Ogden
exchange, he would very seriously consider going back with
the company (T. 89-90).
The testimony of Merrill Wilson, M.D., was solicited by
th,: plaintiff. It is important to note that all of the doctor's
knowledge was based upon heresay; that is, upon what his
secretary had told him. He had no personal experience with
whether or not messages were transmitted. He did indicate that
sometimes the messages were very prompt, but that several
times a week he felt the messages were less than prompt (T.
220-223). The testimony of Dr. Wilson, in fact, was so vague
as to whom he was a subscriber with, that he did not know
the name of the mobile company or anyone connected therewith. [He was, in fact, a subscriber with the protestant.} He
did indicate that the mobile carrier service would call his secretary and inquire as to whether or not the doctor had received
his messages, and the secretary would say that she had not heard
from the doctor ( T. 2 2 4) . This, in fact, demonstrated the
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concern of the protestant that the messages were being
promptly and adequately relayed.
Plaintiff indicated that there were fewer mobile radios
in the metropolitan area of central Utah than in other similar
areas of equal population. However, plaintiff failed to poin:
out that population itself is not the criteria of need. Each area
has its own peculiar needs. Mountain Bell indicated, through
the testimony of Barton North, that there was no appreciable
need, and, therefore, additional channels had not been applied
for by Mountain Bell. Plaintiff compared the Vernal area with
the Salt Lake area. This is misleading because the Vernal area
contains many oil and gas operators in remote areas where
telephone land lines are not available. However, in the central area of Utah, land telephones are available throughout the
area; consequently, there could well be less need for mobile
services on a percentage per population basis than in Vernal or
more remote areas.
The plaintiff called as an adverse witness Max E. Ban·
gerter, president of the protestant corporation. Mr. Bangerter
testified that his corporation was constantly seeking ways oi
raising additional capital, so that it might improve and expana
the equipment for a state-wide operation that it felt it needea
for the future, and that his corporation was considering a pub·
lie stock offering to raise $1,600,000.00 for possible state·
wide expansion (T. 31). Mr. Bangerter indicated that origi·
nally his company had started out with two-way radio uni[)
of the tube type, which were Simplex units with microphont
and speaker. This had been upgraded to transistorized and.
partly-transistorized units. Subsequently, selective calling s_Y'f
terns were also introduced, as well as push-button dials, wh1d !
1
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were protestant's own concept of how push-button dials should
be used in a mobile phone. This concept was introduced by the
protestant to the National Association of Mobile Systems,
and is now being widely accepted (T. 34). Thereafter, duplex
systems were upgraded with the push-button dials.
When channel congestion was felt to be a problem by
the protestant, applications were filed with the F.C.C. for three
additional channels. However, the F.C.C. did not find there
was a sufficient need shown for three channels, so it only
granted two additional channels ( T. 3 7) . Sometime later,
additional channel-loading studies were made. Then protestant felt the need for the additional channels could be substantiated so additional applications were filed with the F.C.C.
(T. 37). Protestant believed that the granting of these additional channels and putting them into operation would greatly
relieve the congested nature of its system. Applications were
filed and amendments were made, but time continued to drag
on pending the F.C.C.'s granting of the additional channels.
A short time before the hearings the channels were granted
and were set for introduction to the protestant's subscribers.
In order to enhance the speed with which the F.C.C.
might act, the record indicates that Mr. Bangerter, at the suggestion of his attorney in Washington, D.C., solicited letters
from subscribers indicating the crowded condition of the
channels.
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In addition to trying to obtain additional channels to
relieve congestion of the then existing channels, the record
indicates that the protestant always tried to service and be
cognizant of the difficulties, if any, that its subscribers might
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have. Even the plaintiff's witnesses testified that protestant wa1
sensitive to their problems. Mr. Isaacson indicated that when
he had his telephone out of his wrecker truck, protestant loaned
him a Pagette so that he would have a method of communica.
tion by which to receive the calls when he needed them (l
154).
Plaintiff's witness, Mr. Bennett, testified that whenever
he had service problems, protestant was more than willing to
service the problems ( T. 2 3 5 ) . Several other witnesses called
by the plaintiff who testified they had problems with the units
in their vehicles, almost without exception, were wrecker driv
ers. It was stated, however, that the problems with units in
stalled in wreckers were greater because the wreckers apparent!)
ride much rougher and the springs are harder, plus the driver
is generally rushing to and from accidents in a hurry, so that
the radios take a considerable beating ( T. 201) . In addition
the telephones in a wrecker are generally in a terribly dirry
environment, so that grease and dirt work down into the equip·
ment and the push buttons. The vibrations of the rough ride
break the printed circuit boards in the equipment. The unit
placed in a Cash W reeker Service truck, operated by Mr
Isaacson, had to be remounted because it had vibrated right of!
the dashboard. The telephone was remounted above the mirror
to give it a better and more solid mounting where the vibrations
might be less. Since that time, however, it was necessary
to tighten the bolts regularly to keep the unit in place (T.
202).

The plaintiff, in fact, testified on cross-examination that
m his business he also had received complaints; that he had
dissatisfied customers, and, also, that he sometimes felt the
20

complaints were not justified (T. 326). It is clear that the
simple fact that complaints are registered does not indicate a
need or inadequate service. It is significant to note that no
official complaints were registered with the Commission about
the protestant.
Max E. Bangerter testified that his company had made a
request of Motorola to phase out certain existing head units
that the protestant was using at that time and to replace them with a new head which did not have any electronics in it other than two or three switches. This would
hopefully relieve some of the vibration problems found in
units such as those placed in rough-riding trucks.
Protestant indicated it had invested a considerable amount
of money in equipment in order to upgrade its service ( T.
206).

Protestant had sought to increase its plant facilities to
better serve the public, and had, as of the date of the Commission's Order, obtained new property, larger and better facilities
and buildings with which it can better serve its subscribers.
Protestant was in the process of doing so at the time of the
hearing before the Commission and was going to obtain new
facilities at which there would be two stalls to drive cars into,
so that it would be better able to serve the public through the
expanded plant facilities ( T. 189) .
There was some question as to whether or not transient
service could be offered by the protestant. At the time of the
hearing, Mr. Bangerter indicated that such service was not
'"'ithin protestant's present tariff, although some service had
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been offered on a test basis. However, subsequently, such
service has been included in a new tariff approved by the Com.
mission. The protestant indicated it would like to make some
sort of hookup arrangement with transients, pending a resolution of the problems, both legal and economical.
Testimony was solicited on behalf of the protestant from
Ben Banks, vice president of Intermountain Lumber Company, who testified that he had been using protestant's service
for several years. He testified that he had used it every day,
seven days a week, for business, personal and church matters.
He indicated that the only problems he had were that some·
times the channels were busy. He had not had any problems
with the service aside from that. He, also, indicated that he
had never missed any business because of a busy line and that
he received his messages very well (T. 575-9).
Michael C. Kenyon testified on behalf of the protestant
and indicated that he had used protestant's service for several
vears; first, with Intermountain Lumber Company and pres·
ently with Georgia-Pacific. He indicated that the service had
been very satisfactory, and that he was very pleased with the
service, having had no problems with receiving his messages
(T. 582).

Alva W. Rawdon was called to testify on behalf of the
protestant and indicated that his service had been excellent.
He testified he was tbe shop manager for Ken Garff Oldsmo·
bile and was acquainted with an individual by the name of
Harold Robinson who had testified on behalf of the plaintiff.
Mr. Rawdon said Mr. Robinson worked for him for approxi·
mately thirty days as an alternate wrecker driver while his
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regular driver was in the hospital. He indicated Mr. Robinson
had never complained to him about any of the services of the
protestant, and that the protestant was always very sensitive to
problems and always very cooperative in taking care of any
technical problems which arose. He also testified that the
mobile radio telephone units in his trucks had shaken loose, and
that the wrecker trucks did ride much more roughly than other
vehicles ( T 585-6).
Testimony was also given by Lalif A. Campbell (T. 600607) Warren Barnes ( T. 608-612) and B. Y. Farrell Packard
(T. 612-623) providing additional support for the excellent
strvice being rendered by the protestant to the public. In fact,
Mr. Packard indicated he had been on both the services of
Mountain Bell and the protestant and had found that the service of the protestant to be about ten times better (T. 615).
In summation, defendant respectfully submits that the
record conclusively demonstrates that the evidence in support
of the plaintiff was, in many instances, incomplete, contradictory, unreliable, and rebuttable; and that the evidence in
support of the protestant clearly indicates, without opposition,
that current public needs were effectively being met, and that
steps were being initiated to meet future needs.

Thus, a reasonable conclusion from the evidence presented
was that the plaintiff did not meet the burden of proving the
established requisites for the issuance of a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity. Therefore, the Public Service Commission reasonably determined that his application should be
denied.
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CONCLUSION
Decisions of the Utah Public Service Commission must
be upheld on appeal, unless they transcend the authority of the
Commission, or are unreasonable from the evidence presented.
In the case at bar, the Commission acted within its authoricy
and reasonably concluded from the evidence presented that
the plaintiff's application was without merit and should be
denied.
We respectfully request this Court to uphold the Public
Service Commission and its decision.
Respectfully submitted
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
G. BLAINE DAVIS
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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